Corporate Law

Constitutionality of Administrative Law Judges at the Securities and Exchange Commission and Elsewhere - Event Audio/Video

2015 National Lawyers Convention
John S. Baker, Jr., Stephen Crimmins, Todd Pettys, Tuan Samahon, F. Scott Kieff November 17, 2015

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently increased its use of administrative proceedings, before Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), to seek civil penalties, as an alternative to proceeding in an Article III court. Other federal regulatory and enforcement agencies use ALJs for various purposes at various rates. Although no single set of rules governs all ALJs, they typically differ from Article III courts in important ways, bringing their use under recent criticism. As two examples, ALJs do not enjoy life tenure and they are sometimes employed by and answerable to the agency itself. Our panel will discuss the pros and cons of the use of ALJs at the SEC and other agencies.

Corporations: Constitutionality of Administrative Law Judges at the Securities and Exchange Commission and Elsewhere
2:00 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.
East Room

  • Prof. John S. Baker, Jr., Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center
  • Mr. Stephen J. Crimmins, Shareholder, Murphy & McGonigle PC
  • Prof. Todd E. Pettys, H. Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil Litigation, University of Iowa College of Law
  • Prof. Tuan Samahon, Villanova University School of Law
  • Moderator: Hon. F. Scott Kieff, Commissioner, International Trade Commission

The Mayflower Hotel
Washington, DC

Guilty as Charged: The Yates Memo - Podcast

Criminal Law & Procedure Practice Group Podcast
James R. Copland, Paul J. Larkin, John G. Malcolm October 26, 2015

On September 15, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates issued a much-talked about memo, directing federal prosecutors to focus their efforts on individual corporate wrong-doers, not just corporate entities. Unclear in the minds of many is just how much effort will now be expended on corporate entities vs. individuals. Some assert that prosecution of corporate entities is rarely a good idea, since the punishment negatively effects the shareholders, who were often the victims of the initial wrongdoing. Others note that it can be near impossible to prove what should be a required guilty state of mind in an individual operating within a corporate structure. More complications arise when individuals rely in good faith on legal advice from in-house or outside counsel.


  • James R. Copland, Director, Center for Legal Policy, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research
  • Paul J. Larkin, Senior Legal Research Fellow, Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, The Heritage Foundation
  • Moderator: John G. Malcolm, Director, Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and Ed Gilbertson and Sherry Lindberg Gilbertson Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation

The Short-Termism Debate - Event Video

2014 National Lawyers Convention
Lucian Bebchuk, Jonathan R. Macey, Robert T. Miller, Steven A. Rosenblum, E. Norman Veasey November 14, 2014

For thirty years, the economic analysis of corporate law has been based on the assumption that shareholder value is a reliable proxy for social welfare.  However, for some time now, the large majority of the shares in some public companies have been held by institutional investors, including pension funds and mutual funds.  These investors have some incentive to favor short-term profits at the expense longer-term benefits.  Can shareholder value still be reliably equated with social welfare?  Or does the current incentive structure encourage the misallocation of resources and a net social loss?

The Federalist Society's Corporations, Securities & Antitrust Practice Groups presented this panel on "The Short-Termism Debate" on Thursday, November 13, during the 2014 National Lawyers Convention.


  • Prof. Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School
  • Prof. Jonathan R. Macey, Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law, Yale Law School
  • Prof. Robert T. Miller, Professor of Law and F. Arnold Daum Fellow in Corporate Law, University of Iowa College of Law
  • Mr. Steven A. Rosenblum, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
  • Moderator: Hon. E. Norman Veasey, Former Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court

Mayflower Hotel
Washington, DC

Fraud on the Market: Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund Decided - Podcast

Corporations, Securities & Antitrust and Litigation Practice Groups Podcast
George T. Conway III July 17, 2014

On Monday, June 23, 2014 the Supreme Court issued a 9-0 decision in the highly anticipated securities fraud case Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund. The case offered the Court an opportunity to revisit its 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson, in which it adopted the “fraud on the market” doctrine. Fraud on the market is critical to modern securities fraud class action lawsuits -- the doctrine assumes that any misrepresentations of a security traded in an efficient market will affect that security’s market price and thus affect any shareholders trading in reliance of market price, an assumption that precludes consideration of whether potential class members actually heard and acted on fraudulent statements. The Court declined to overturn Basic; our expert discussed the reasoning and impact of the decision.

  • George T. Conway III, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz