Criminal Law & Procedure

Federal Oversight of Local Police Departments

Criminal Law & Procedure Practice Group Teleforum Monday, April 24, 02:00 PMFederalist Society Teleforum Conference Call

Under Attorney Generals Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch, the Department of Justice entered into a number of consent decrees with local police departments to change certain police practices.  Given the ongoing review of these decrees, how will the federal government’s approach to police practices change during Jeff Sessions’ tenure as Attorney General?  What alternative methods might the DOJ employ or encourage states and municipalities to employ to help remedy problematic police practices?


  • Chuck Canterbury, President, Fraternal Order of Police
  • Vanita Gupta, President, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
  • Moderator: Brian Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado - Post-Decision SCOTUScast

SCOTUScast 4-6-17 featuring John C. Richter
John C. Richter April 06, 2017

On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado. Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. Two jurors later informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that another juror made racially-biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez and an alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits detailing what the allegedly biased juror had said. Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial after learning from the affidavits that the juror had suggested Pena-Rodriguez was guilty because he was Hispanic (and this juror considered Hispanic males to be sexually aggressive toward females). According to the affidavits, the juror also deemed the alibi witness not credible because, among other things, that witness was “an illegal.” The trial court denied the motion and a divided Supreme Court of Colorado ultimately affirmed, applying Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b)--which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations--and finding that none of the exceptions to the rule applied. In the dissenters’ view, however, Rule 606(b) should have yielded to “the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury.”

The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a no-impeachment rule constitutionally may bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

By a vote of 5-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado and remanded the case. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, while held that when a juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined.

To discuss the case, we have John C. Richter, who is Partner at King & Spalding.

Packingham v. North Carolina - Post-Argument SCOTUScast

SCOTUScast 3-30-17 featuring Ilya Shapiro
Ilya Shapiro March 30, 2017

On February 27, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Packingham v. North Carolina. Lester Packingham was convicted in 2002 of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in violation of North Carolina law, and sentenced to prison time followed by supervised release. In 2010, he was arrested after authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile--which he had set up using an alias--in which he thanked God for having a parking ticket dismissed. Packingham was charged with, and convicted of, violating a North Carolina law that restricted the access of convicted sex offenders to “commercial social networking” websites.
Packingham challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the North Carolina statute unlawfully restricted his freedom of speech and association, but the Supreme Court of North Carolina ultimately rejected his claim. The website access restriction, the Court concluded, was a content-neutral, conduct-based regulation that only incidentally burdened Packingham’s speech, was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest, and left open ample alternative channels of communication.

The question before the U.S. Supreme Court is whether, under the Court’s First Amendment precedents, a law that makes it a felony for any person on the state's registry of former sex offenders to “access” a website that enables communication, expression, and the exchange of information among users--if the site is “know[n]” to allow minors to have accounts--is permissible on its face and as applied to Packingham.

To discuss the case, we have Ilya Shapiro, who is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute.