Litigation Practice Group Podcast
On March 8, Judge Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood of the District Court of Guam struck down a Guam law that permitted only those who meet the definition of “Native Inhabitants of Guam” to vote in a future status plebiscite. This decision has been met with opposition from elected officials, protests at the federal courthouse, public rallies, and now an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Supporters of the plebiscite are forcing a reexamination of the role of the United States on this strategically important island and opponents contend they are doing so without giving all citizens a voice in the process. What did the district court decide, and what does the reaction say about the rule of law and respect for the Constitution? Christian Adams joined us to discuss the latest in Davis v. Guam.
SCOTUScast 3-21-17 featuring Howard J. Klein
Howard J. Klein March 21, 2017
On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp. Promega Corporation owned four patents for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing and was the exclusive licensee of a fifth patent. In 2010, Promega sued Life Technologies Corporation (LifeTech) for allegedly infringing on these patents. A jury found in favor of Promega but the district court nevertheless ruled for LifeTech, concluding that Promega had failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the favorable jury verdict. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed that judgment, holding that the four Promega patents were ultimately invalid but agreeing that LifeTech had infringed the fifth patent and remanding to the district court for a determination of damages. In the course of its ruling, the Federal Circuit concluded that LifeTech’s supplying of a single, commodity component of a mulit-component invention had exposed LifeTech under federal law to damages liability on worldwide sales.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States exposes a manufacturer to liability for worldwide sales.
By a vote of 7-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention for manufacture abroad does not give rise to liability under Section 271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, which prohibits the supply from the United States of "all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention" for combination abroad. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justices Thomas and Alito joined the majority opinion as to all but Part II-C. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Chief Justice Roberts was recused.
To discuss the case, we have Howard J. Klein who is Attorney at Law at Klein, O’Neill & Singh, LLP. International & National Security Law Podcast
Historically, protecting national security meant protecting one’s own citizens and sovereign territory from the threats or opposing interests of other nation-states. The concept has broadened, however, as transnational terrorists act with unprecedented scale and range: the threats they pose are of a magnitude previously only possible for nation-states, and they act indiscriminately among the several countries they feel justified in attacking. The United States’ interest in defeating these actors, then, is one that is shared by many other countries that are not necessarily our allies in a larger sense.
In this the final episode of our three-part Security Partnership Series, we discussed the benefits and limits of partnerships with foreign government agencies for counterterrorism purposes. What conditions form the basis of a productive partnership? How might such partnerships compromise our operations? How do we decide how much information to share? Does partnering with a foreign country’s intelligence agency limit our own independent intelligence gathering capabilities? Perhaps most controversially – what limits can or should be imposed on the methods used to collect the counterterrorism intelligence to be shared? Of the foreign governments that have publicly complained about the United States’ use of certain signals intelligence capabilities, do their intelligence agencies nevertheless desire the information collected? Likewise, although the United States has banned certain interrogation methods domestically, might our intelligence agencies nevertheless want to obtain human intelligence information gathered by foreign agencies using those or other similar methods?
International & National Security Law Podcast
- Amb. Ryan C. Crocker , Dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University
- William K Lietzau, Vice President, Deputy General Counsel, PAE
- Salli A. Swartz, Partner, Artus Wise Partners
- Moderator: Adam Pearlman, Special Advisor to the International and National Security Law Practice Group
Steven Giaier March 08, 2017
On February 21, the Supreme Court heard argument in Hernandez v. Mesa. In July of 2010, a 15-year-old adolescent named Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca and his friends were playing along a concrete structure on the border of the U.S. and Mexico. When Jesus Mesa, Jr., a U.S. Border Patrol Agent arrived, he detained one of the youths on the border, and shot and killed Hernandez, who was hiding behind a pillar of the Paso Del Norte Bridge on the Mexican side of the border. Hernandez’s parents sued Agent Mesa under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment for the use of unlawful and disproportionate force. Agent Mesa argued that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments did not apply because Hernandez was not a U.S. citizen.
The District Court found for Agent Mesa, while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but the Fourth Amendment did not, and that Agent Mesa should not receive qualified immunity. The main questions for the Supreme Court to answer are: Does the Fourth Amendment apply? Should qualified immunity apply to the border patrol agent? And can Agent Mesa make a Bivens claim?
Steve Giaier of the House Committee on Homeland Security attended oral argument and shared his perceptions.
International & National Security Law Practice Group Podcast
- Steven Giaier, Senior Counsel, House Committee on Homeland Security
On February 21, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Hernandez v. Mesa. In July of 2010, a 15-year-old adolescent named Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca and his friends were playing along a concrete structure on the border of the U.S. and Mexico. When Jesus Mesa, Jr., a U.S. Border Patrol Agent arrived, he detained one of the youths on the border, and shot and killed Hernandez, who was hiding behind a pillar of the Paso Del Norte Bridge on the Mexican side of the border. Hernandez’s parents sued Agent Mesa under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment for the use of unlawful and disproportionate force. Agent Mesa argued that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments did not apply because Hernandez was not a U.S. citizen. The District Court found for Agent Mesa, while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment Protections against deadly force applied but the Fourth Amendment did not, and that Agent Mesa should not receive qualified immunity.
Professor Andrew Kent of Fordham University School of Law and Professor Stephen I. Vladeck of UT Austin Law School joined us to examine the case and its implications for extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights and for qualified immunity.
- Prof. Andrew Kent, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
- Prof. Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law, The University of Texas at Austin School of Law