Financial Services & E-Commerce Practice Group Podcast
Members of the Federalist Society’s Financial Services & E-Commerce Practice Group Executive Committee provided an update on recent important activity at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The call will cover many interesting topics including an update of PHH’s D.C. Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals case against the CFPB, a recent Executive Order which appears to apply to the CFPB, congressional activity regarding the CFPB, the CFPB’s recent fines and other actions, and the CFPB’s (and Federal Reserve Board’s) Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit report entitled “The CFPB Can Strengthen Contract Award Controls and Administrative Processes.”
Short video featuring Rachel Paulose
- Hon. Wayne A. Abernathy, Executive VP for Financial Institutions Policy and Regulatory Affairs, American Bankers Association
- Julius L. Loeser, Of Counsel, Winston & Strawn LLP
Is the SEC limited to five years if it wants to make a criminal defendant pay back money obtained illegally? Rachel Paulose, partner at DLA Piper, explains the dispute in Kokesh v. SEC. Charles Kokesh claims that a five-year statute of limitations applies, while the Securities and Exchange Commission maintains that illegally obtained money should be paid back regardless of how much time has passed. SCOTUS oral argument is April 18, 2017. Litigation Practice Group Podcast
On Saturday, March 11 the House passed the Fairness in Class Litigation Act by a vote of 220-201. The stated purpose of the Act is to “(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members and multidistrict litigation plaintiffs; (2) diminish abuses in class action and mass tort litigation; and (3) restore the intent of the framers…by ensuring Federal court consideration of interstate controversies of national importance consistent with diversity jurisdiction principles” (H.R.985, 2017).
The Bill amends the federal judicial code’s standards for the certification of class action. For example, the bill requires that proposed class members to show that they suffered the same type and degree of injury. The bill also limits the amount and timing of attorney’s fees in a class action. Attorney’s cannot be paid more than the class members, and they must be paid after the class members receive payment.
Andrew Grossman Partner at Baker & Hostetler LLP and Adjunct Scholar at the Cato Institute will join Professor Howard M. Erichson of Fordham to discuss the legislation as deliberations begin in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Intellectual Property Practice Group Podcast
- Professor Howard M. Erichson, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law
- Andrew Grossman, Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Adjunct Scholar, the Cato Institute
The question presented in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC is seemingly straightforward: Does the statute governing venue generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), supplement the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)? In particular, the issue is whether § 1391(c)(2)’s broad residency definition, which provides that a corporate defendant “shall be deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction,” should be read into § 1400(b), which provides that a patent infringement action “may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides.” If a corporate defendant “resides” wherever a court has personal jurisdiction over it, a patent owner will typically have many choices of where it may sue that corporation for infringement.
TC Heartland is incorporated and headquartered in Indiana, while Kraft Foods is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Illinois. Kraft Foods sued in the District of Delaware, arguing that TC Heartland established personal jurisdiction—and thus venue—when it knowingly shipped a large number of allegedly infringing goods into that forum. The Federal Circuit held that the patent venue statute is supplemented by the broad definition of residency in § 1391(c). TC Heartland now asks the Supreme Court to reverse the decision and to hold that § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive statute governing venue in patent infringement actions.
The case itself has garnered much attention because the same broad venue rules also allow non-practicing entities—so-called “patent trolls”—to sue in the Eastern District of Texas. Indeed, the policy implications of the case have taken center stage among many commentators.
The issue of where patent owners may sue alleged infringers is an important one, and this case will determine whether patent owners, like federal plaintiffs generally, have numerous choices, or whether they are limited by the narrow patent venue rules that the Supreme Court has already said should stand alone.
Litigation Practice Group Podcast
- Prof. J. Devlin Hartline, Assistant Director, Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) and Adjunct Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University
This Teleforum discussed what Victor Schwartz has labelled "Deep-Pocket Jurisprudence™." According to Mr. Schwartz, this occurs when state appellate courts expand tort law to include an innocent defendant because the wrongdoer is "judgment proof" or cannot be reached by the judicial process. The Supreme Court of Iowa has used the term and condemned the practice.
This call focused on the possible enactment of federal civil justice reform. On March 9 and 10th 2017 the House of Representatives passed three federal civil justice reform measures, namely the H.R. 720, Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, H.R. 725, Innocent Party Protection Act and H.R.925, the Fairness in Class Litigation Act. Each enjoy strong support from Speaker Paul Ryan and this marks the earliest in a congressional term that such federal civil justice reform measures have passed the House. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether they will pass through the Senate and be approved by President Trump.
- Victor E. Schwartz, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP