Privacy and Cell-Site Simulators Criminal Law & Procedure Practice Group Teleforum Tuesday, July 19, 01:00 PMFederalist Society Teleforum Conference Call
Cell-site simulators are devices used by law enforcement. In response to the signals emitted by a cell-site simulator, cellular devices in the proximity identify the simulator as the most attractive cell tower in the area and transmit signals to the simulator that identify the device. Using these simulators, investigators can locate cellular devices whose unique identifiers are already known to law enforcement, or determine the unique identifiers of an unknown device by collecting limited signaling information from devices in the simulator user’s vicinity.
It has been a subject of debate whether the use of cell-site simulators by the government requires a warrant supported by probable cause. In September 2015, the Justice Department released a policy requiring federal investigators to obtain a warrant prior to employing a simulator, except under exceptional circumstances.
Is there a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in the data collected by cell-site simulators? Who is in the best position to establish limits in this area (if any), Congress or the courts? Should investigators be permitted to use simulators, even with a warrant?
International & National Security Law Practice Group Podcast
- Howard W. Cox, Adjunct Professor, George Washington University
- Prof. Brian L. Owsley, Assistant Professor of Law, UNT Dallas College of Law
In the aftermath of the San Bernadino terrorist attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigations sought the assistance of Apple in its investigation. An Apple phone used by one of the terrorists included a function, which the FBI wanted Apple to defeat, that would automatically delete all stored information after ten failed hacking attempts. Defeating the function would have required Apple employees to write code, which Apple contended amounted to compelled speech. Privacy issues were also asserted, but countered, at least in part, by the fact that the user of the phone was deceased, and the phone was actually owned by a local government. After the FBI used other sources to get the information it sought, Apple moved against the FBI to disclose exactly whether and how it had bypassed the delete function. Our experts discussed this interesting matter and next steps.
International & National Security Law Practice Group Podcast
- Prof. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Assistant Professor of Law, Nebraska College of Law
- Jamil N. Jaffer, Adjunct Professor of Law and Director, Homeland and National Security Law Program, George Mason University School of Law and former Chief Counsel and Senior Advisor, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
In 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12333. It assigned foreign intelligence collection responsibilities to the agencies that make up the Intelligence Community. Among those responsibilities is electronic surveillance. Following the Edward Snowden disclosures, President Obama placed additional restrictions on the collection and use of certain foreign intelligence, and privacy advocates have argued that additional scrutiny must be applied to electronic surveillance related to Executive Order 12333. Our experts discussed how such collection works, how the intelligence is used, and how this activity supports national security.
2015 National Lawyers Convention
- Matthew G. Olsen, President, IronNet Cybersecurity
- David R. Shedd, Distinguished Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Adjunct Professor, Patrick Henry College
- Moderator: Matthew R.A. Heiman, Vice President, Chief Compliance & Audit Officer, Tyco International
Supporters of mandated disclosure of the source of speech (or of money used to pay for speech) claim it can provide important information to the public and the legal system. But opponents say it violates privacy rights and can also deter the sources from speaking or contributing.
This debate also applies to reporters' confidential sources. In both situations, disclosure (of who contributed or spent, or who a confidential source was) may provide useful information to voters, prosecutors, civil litigants, judges, or jurors. In both situations, requiring disclosure of the source may deter people from contributing to controversial campaigns or organizations, or from talking to journalists. Politically, people tend to react differently to these reactions – confidentiality of contributors tends to be more supported by conservatives, while confidentiality of journalists' sources tends to be more supported by liberals. But structurally, are these issues similar? This panel will consider both these questions together.
Free Speech: A Right to Speak Anonymously? Political Contributors and Reporters’ Confidential Sources
3:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.
- Mr. Andrew M. Grossman, Associate, BakerHostetler
- Mr. Stephen Klein, Pillar of Law Institute
- Mr. Paul S. Ryan, Senior Counsel, Campaign Legal Center
- Hon. Hans von Spakovsky, Manager, Election Law Reform Initiative and Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
- Moderator: Hon. Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Michigan
- Introduction: Mr. Manuel Klausner, Co-Founder, Trustee, and Legal Advisor, Reason Foundation and General Counsel, Individual Rights Foundation
The Mayflower Hotel International & National Security Law Practice Group Podcast
Adam Klein October 30, 2015
In October of 2015, The Intercept, a website founded by Edward Snowden confidant Glenn Greenwald, unveiled "The Drone Papers," a series of stories based on secret documents provided by a new, anonymous leaker in the U.S. Government. Many in the media hailed the series, calling for congressional investigations and major changes in U.S. policy.
Adam Klein, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, discussed "The Drone Papers" -- what they are, what they reveal about U.S. operations, what claims they do and do not support, and the implications for counterterrorism law and policy.
- Adam Klein, Visiting Fellow, Center for a New American Security