The Federalist Society Online Debate Series
The Employee Free Choice Act
June 1, 2009
On March 10, 2009, the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) was re-introduced to Congress by Sen. Ted Kennedy and Rep. George Miller. The EFCA would amend existing labor law to incorporate provisions for card check, mandatory arbitration, and higher penalties for organizational unfair labor practices. (The full text of the EFCA is available here.) In this installment of Originally Speaking, Richard Epstein (NYU/University of Chicago), Thomas Kochan (MIT), Eugene Scalia (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP), and Patrick Szymanski (Change to Win) debate the policy and constitutionality of the EFCA.
Patrick Szymanski and Thomas Kochan
![]() The evidence is overwhelming that America’s basic labor law is broken and fails to allow workers to exercise their fundamental human right to join a union and enjoy the benefits of collective bargaining without fear of employer reprisal, unreasonable delay, and the unfortunately very real risk of being fired.
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Eugene Scalia
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The Opening Statement by Pat and Tom offers the union case for amending the labor laws. Let me briefly address the specific amendments at issue, then turn to their premise that labor “reform” is needed. |
Richard Epstein
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There is a weird sense of unreality in the opening statement of Patrick Syzmanski and Thomas Kochan in support of the Employee Free Choice Act. On the substantive side, their sunny descriptions of EFCA’s key provisions gloss over all the reasons why employers have expressed such intense opposition to the bill. Yet they nonetheless insist that enacting EFCA will usher in a golden age in which “progressive employers” can partner with unions and government regulators to boost this nation’s productive capacity—without saying how. |
Patrick Szymanski and Thomas Kochan
![]() Eugene Scalia and Richard Epstein oppose not just the Employee Free Choice Act but the very basic right of workers to form an organization of their own choosing to represent them in collective bargaining with their employer. To argue against what has been recognized as a fundamental human right and a bedrock principle of American democracy demonstrates the extremes to which opponents of labor law reform are willing to go. That is not where the majority of Americans is today or has been since the National Labor Relations Act became law in 1935!
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Richard Epstein
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How Fundamental Is the Right of Workers To Organize? |
Eugene Scalia
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When I opened Pat and Tom’s post and saw their reference to “a fundamental human right and a bedrock principle of American democracy,” I thought they were going to address EFCA’s denial of the secret ballot and infringement of campaign speech. No such luck. Their “fundamental right” is increased unionization. It’s fine if this occurs at the expense of the secret ballot, and to defend employer “free speech,” as I did, is to defend “illegal actions” and “firing” union supporters. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that employers can and do oppose unionization through constitutionally-protected speech that is not coercive and furthers employees’ own interests. An informed vote is a better vote. That’s why patently implausible data about 50 million Americans wishing to belong to a hypothetical union is meaningless—What would that union’s dues be? How competitive would the company be if unionized? What is the union’s record on ethics, strikes, and actually bettering workers’ conditions? When employees learn these things, they see “cons” to unionizing. Campaigns change minds through information and reasoning—and that’s what EFCA aims to stop. Supposed EFCA “compromises”—such as conducting secret ballot elections within two weeks of a union’s request—share EFCA’s goal of amassing union power through elections-by-ambush that catch employers unawares and give employees less process and information than when voting for school board. Why change the election apparatus? For each of the last 12 years, unions have won more than half the representation elections. (Daily Labor Report, May 5, 2008). In 2007 their win rate was 60 percent. In 2008 it was nearly 67 percent, the highest since 1955. In a 2008 paper, Tom and a co-author concluded that an unfair labor practice, or “ULP,” makes a union “no less likely to win an election.” (“Sequential Failures In Workers’ Right To Organize” at 3). In another article Tom’s co-author reiterated that “pre-election ULP charges seem to have no effect on election outcomes.” (John-Paul Ferguson, “The Eye of the Needle,” Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. at 17 (Oct. 2008)). Tom and others claim that illegal employer conduct outside the election process affects organizing and bargaining, and we can address that later if they wish—but the fact is that with EFCA, unions are trying to “fix” elections in the worst sense of that phrase. * * * In addition to erroneously asserting that I oppose a statutory right to organize, Pat and Tom say that I want to “turn the clock back” to an earlier era of labor-management relations. That was their suggestion, not mine—I merely supplied a reminder how acrimonious and destructive labor relations once were. I am confident that our readers know how tumultuous that period was (just as I’m confident they recognize that “union leaders” seldom are “partners” who seek “high productivity” and “service quality”). But those interested in learning more about the days EFCA’s proponents want to bring back—and the mistaken romanticization of the era—should read the chapter in the Lichtenstein book cited in my first post. |
Thomas Kochan
![]() It is not “increased unionization” that is the fundamental human right at stake here as Eugene argues. What is at stake is the fundamental right of workers as stated in the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” by the ILO, a branch of the UN. One of the four fundamental principles (endorsed by the US and 272 other countries) is: “Freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.” So it is workers’ rights not the rate of unionization that needs to be both protected and fostered by our law and our practices. |
Richard Epstein
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Against Compulsory Interest Arbitration |
Patrick Szymanski
![]() The central provision of the National Labor Relations Act is Section 7 (29 U.S.C. §187). It says simply and directly, “Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection.” The readers will judge for themselves, but I think Tom and I have shown the law is badly broken, that the current procedures are utterly inadequate to protect employees who exercise this right, and that the Employee Free Choice Act is the most effective way to correct the problem.
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Thomas Kochan
![]() Getting Real About Interest Arbitration |
Eugene Scalia
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Tom and I find some common ground with his emphasis on workers’ freedom of association rather than unionization per se. A corollary to the freedom of association is the freedom not to associate with those whose views you oppose. Existing labor law already intrudes on this First Amendment interest by “compel[ling] workers to help finance a union even though their “moral or religious views . . . may not square” with the union’s or, indeed, they may “have economic or political objections to unionism itself.” Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
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Richard Epstein
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Getting Real About Arbitration Continued |
Eugene Scalia
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I want to ensure that two issues are clear to our readers, and then comment on Tom’s assurances about mandatory arbitration. First, in popular culture unionization is portrayed as a bottom-up, grassroots movement with so many Norma Raes banding together to challenge domineering corporate titans. In truth, union organizing is directed and typically initiated by paid union organizers from outside the worksite who unionize companies for a living. An organizing campaign pits them and a well-financed national union against a company that may have a smaller annual budget than the union and no experience with organizing campaigns. EFCA—and suggested EFCA “compromises”—seek to exploit this advantage by enabling a union to conduct an organizational blitzkrieg that succeeds before the company knows what’s happening or, at least, before it can retain advisors with expertise to match the union’s to devise and implement a response. Second, what we are discussing is to a degree the antithesis of arbitration as commonly understood: The “interest” arbitrator acts not as judge, interpreting the parties’ agreement, but as legislator, writing the “terms and conditions” of employment, a broad concept as Richard explains that affects fundamental operational matters (subcontracting; introduction of cost-saving technology), not merely wages and hours. Such government-imposed labor “contracts” fly in the face of long-standing American labor policy. In the words of New-Dealer Hugo Black: “[I]t was recognized from the beginning [under our labor laws] that agreement might in some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that the Government would in such cases step in, become a party to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement.” H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970). Tom says the Obama Administration would offer a list of neutral, expert arbitrators. We do not settle for such assurances about other government decision-makers: Judges must be confirmed by the Senate and their decisions can be appealed. Civil servants operate under statutorily-prescribed ethical rules and their actions are appealable too. An EFCA arbitrator would hold more sway than the Secretary of Labor over a given workplace. Yet the text of EFCA provides no opportunity to challenge the slate of arbitrators, or to appeal their awards. Does Tom’s embellishment of the statutory text provide either of those protections? Government regulators are politically accountable. Will EFCA’s arbitration overseers be? If not, how is their position constitutional? As to the assurance that arbitrators will impose “standard” terms that are “common” in the industry and “mirror” other collective bargaining agreements: What a terrible prescription for a national economy that depends on innovative—individual businesspeople identifying how to do things differently and more effectively than their competitors. “Fear not, Toyota, you’ll get GM’s work rules” is slim consolation. The prospect of overworked government appointees imposing unimaginative cookie-cutter operating rules on broad swaths of American industry is nearly as disturbing as the back-hall maneuvering between political appointees and labor unions that will produce EFCA’s slate of “neutral” arbitrators. Practices in the non-competitive public sector and experimentations of a few Canadian provinces cannot justify putting this straitjacket on the American economy. |
Richard Epstein
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Labor Relations, Made Easy |
Thomas Kochan
![]() Richard and Eugene keep grasping at imaginary straws to oppose a fair, proven system for engaging neutral experts as mediators and arbitrators to ensure workers and employers achieve a collective bargaining agreement tailored to meet their needs. Among their erroneous imaginations: |
Patrick Szymanski
![]() So, we’ve come to our final posting in this debate, and I want to end with a focus on the first contract arbitration issue. Professor Kate Bronfenbrenner from the Cornell University Industrial Relations School recently released an update of her previous studies of employer opposition to organizing (Economic Policy Institute, http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp235/ ). The report is based on a random sample of 1,004 NLRB elections that took place during the period of 1999-2003 and an in-depth survey of 562 campaigns within that sample. I’m sure Eugene will criticize the report as he has the Professor’s previous work, but (and you can look it up) hard facts based on government documents show that employers have increasingly resorted to threats, discharges, interrogations, surveillance, and changes in wages and benefits to undermine union organizing efforts. |
Eugene Scalia
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The role of government in bettering the terms and conditions of employment was one of the most important debates of the first part of the last century, as reflected in the numerous watershed constitutional cases involving employment regulation, including Lochner and the “switch in time that saved nine” in West Coast Hotel. Two types of employment regulation were advanced—direct legal regulation of employment terms, and bolstering workers’ leverage to negotiate terms for themselves, through labor unions. Today, direct legal regulation in the area of employment is—as in virtually all economic spheres—widespread and firmly established. It is performed by government agencies and a new class of employee champions, the plaintiffs’ bar, who today may put more dollars in workers’ pockets than unions. As politicians—joined by common law judges—have endeavored to do more for workers, unions have been needed less. Further, international competition has curtailed business’s ability to pass the costs of unionization onto consumers, making employers in some instances more resistant to unionization (albeit less belligerently so) and limiting what unions can deliver for a dollar in membership dues. Direct legal regulation of employment and unionization are intended to achieve many of the same things; dual regulation is inefficient and to some extent undesirable for employers and workers; although there are arguments to be made for the union model that even conservatives can like (see Eugene Scalia, “Ending Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy,” Harv. J. L. P. Pol’y, 2001), direct legal regulation is ascendant. These and the other factors identified in my first post are the reasons for unions’ decline, not a supposed rise in employer hooliganism that pales beside the violent employer misconduct of unions’ heyday. Compared to unionism, an advantage of direct regulation is labor peace and relative predictability. One of the most significant parts of this exchange was Pat and Tom’s statement that EFCA will turn the clock back to the labor relations of the 40s through 70s. That was a period of labor turmoil—the historical record speaks for itself—that employees, employers, and consumers do not want again. Pat and Tom may believe that the 21 times Democratic presidents sought “national emergency” injunctions against strikes were mistaken, but The New York Times’s demand for an emergency injunction in 2002 after just a 10-day work stoppage on the ports illustrates that even some of EFCA’s most vocal supporters could not abide the labor conditions this bill would bring. Senators and congressmen wishing to demonstrate support for organized labor by voting for labor “reform” need to consider whether returning to the labor environment of the 40s, 50s, and 60s is an “achievement” their constituents would soon forgive. So much for the diagnosis. The cure? Pat and Tom have essentially declined to defend card check, with its obvious opportunities for abuse and intimidation. Just remember, the “compromises” that union supporters are now proposing are different means to the same end—denying employees a free, informed choice on one of the most important votes of their lives, in order to “fix” elections that are not broken. And “interest” arbitration? Here too, Pat and Tom have declined to defend EFCA as written. And we do not need the largest government intervention in the terms and conditions of employment in our history to prop up a labor movement that—while it has achieved commendable things—is not needed to the extent it once was. |

