The administrative state is often defended as a necessary response to modern conditions that make governance through ordinary legislation virtually impossible. Is the administrative process in fact more efficient than legislation (and what is meant in this context by “efficient”)? Do any benefits from the administrative process come at the expense of other values? If the legislative process is subject to gridlock, is gridlock all bad? If capture or influence by interest groups is a problem, is it likely to be a worse problem in agency or legislative settings?
Does congressional abdication contribute to bureaucratic sclerosis, which makes it difficult to start and maintain businesses? Finally, what role do the Court's doctrines play at the intersection of these questions? Is Chevron deference to agencies good? Does the president's control make the administrative state better or worse? Do the Court's doctrines in Bowsher and Chadha give agencies too much power?
Panel 2: Congress vs. Agencies: Balancing Checks and Efficiency: Gridlock, Organized Interests, and Regulatory Capture
9:00 a.m.- 10:45 a.m.
- Prof. David Engstrom, Stanford Law School
- Hon. C. Boyden Gray, Former White House Counsel
- Prof. Lisa Heinzerling, Georgetown University School of Law
- Prof. Michael W. McConnell, Stanford Law School
- Moderator: Hon. Lois Haight, Superior Court of California
- Introduction: Mr. Michael Reynolds, Co-Chair, 2012 Annual Student Symposium
Stanford Law School