Both the House-passed and the Senate-passed health care reform bills include language that protects from discrimination health care providers who are unwilling to participate in abortions.  However, the House language is broader in scope than the Senate language.  Also, both bills have non-preemption clauses for federal conscience laws, but not for state conscience laws.  Finally, neither bill includes conscience protection that would cover other controversial practices, such as the provision of emergency contraception or performance of sterilizations.

Many provisions of the “Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act” (H.R. 1388) or “Generations Invigorating Volunteerism and Education Act” (“GIVE Act”) (the Act’s previous moniker) took effect on October 1, 2009.¹  The Act was passed by the House by a vote of 321-105 on March 18, 2009,² ratified by the Senate on March 26, 2009 by a vote of 79-19,³ and signed into law by President Obama on April 21, 2009.⁴  The final legislation measures 142 pages.⁵  Sponsored by Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY),⁶ the Act reauthorizes and expands federally funded national service programs by amending the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (“NCSA”) and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 (“DVSA”)⁷ and authorizes between $5.7 billion⁸ and $6 billion⁹ to support various community service-oriented initiatives, including AmeriCorps (and others),¹⁰ over the course of the next six years through its scheduled conclusion in 2014.¹¹

Suppose that a new Christian church in town announced that it will have a special focus on the biblical story of Jesus turning water into wine. Accordingly, rather than the single sip of wine commonly consumed at other Christian services, worshippers at the new church drink several glasses of wine as part of the service, in imitation of the wedding guests at Cana...

The U.S. Supreme Court is quite vigilant in enforcing its justiciability rules concerning standing to sue. For over half a century, however, the Supreme Court has reduced the rigor of its standing rules when a claim is lodged under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court famously did so with respect to federal taxpayer standing in the venerable case of Flast v. Cohen, but in no instance other than claims invoking the Establishment Clause is federal or state taxpayer standing ever permitted. Less well known is the reduced rigor with which the Court has applied its standing rules when it comes to a plaintiff’s “unwanted exposure” to a religious symbol or other speech attributable to the government...